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1. INTRODUCTION 
SADC is made up of 15 countries, which, as the name suggests, are located in Southern 
Africa.
1
  The constitutions of all these countries prohibit torture, cruel inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment. All these countries have also ratified the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights which prohibits torture.2  Most of these countries have also 
ratified the UN Convention against Torture
3
 and all of them have ratified or acceded to other 
international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
4
 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child that expressly prohibit torture.
5
 The purpose of this 
article is to discuss the jurisprudence emanating from different SADC courts on the measures 
taken to protect the right to freedom from torture. The article starts by highlighting the 
provisions on the right to freedom from torture in the constitutions of different SADC 
countries and thereafter the author discusses the definition of torture, the difference between 
torture on the one hand and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on the 
other hand, the status of the right to freedom from torture in the eyes of the courts, the factors 
that courts consider as creating a conducive environment for torture, the issue of deporting or 
extraditing a person to a country where he or she could be subjected to torture, proving 
allegations of torture, actions that courts have taken or have recommended to be taken against 
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 These countries are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
2
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public officials implicated in torture, some forms of punishment that have been declared as 
torture, and the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture. Some examples have been 
drawn from as many SADC countries as possible but this has not been possible in respect of 
all issues and all countries because of the lack of readily accessible case law.
6
 Had the author 
had access to all the relevant case law from all SADC countries on all the issues discussed 
here, the paper would have represented a complete picture of the measures taken by the 
courts to protect the right to freedom from torture.  
 
2. CONSTITUTIONS 
The right to freedom from torture is protected in the constitutions of Botswana,
7
 Lesotho,
8
 
Mozambique,
9
 South Africa,
10
 Tanzania,
11
 Zambia,
12
 Seychelles,
13
 Swaziland,
14
 Malawi,
15
 
Mauritius,
16
 Namibia,
17
 and Zimbabwe.
18
 It is important to note that the constitutions of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, and Mauritius although provide that no 
one shall be subjected to torture, they, unlike the UN Convention against Torture, exclude the 
word “cruel.” This, however, does not mean that they do not prohibit cruel punishment or 
treatment. Unlike the constitutions of all the above countries, the constitution of Mozambique 
provides that “all citizens... shall not be subjected to torture...” A strict reading of that 
provision could lead to an interpretation that the right to freedom from torture of non-citizens 
                                                          
6
 Because of language barrier, the author was unable to refer to case law from Angola, DRC, Madagascar and 
Mozambique. 
7
 Article 7(1) provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other treatment.’ 
8
 Article 8(1) provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other treatment.’ 
9
 Article 40(1) provides that ‘[a]ll citizens shall have the right to life and to physical and moral integrity, and 
they shall not be subjected to torture or to cruel or inhuman treatment.’  
10
 Section 12(1)(d) and (e) provide that ‘[e]very one has the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right – not to be tortured in any way; and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way.’    
11
 Article 13(6)(e) provides that ‘no person shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or 
treatment.’ 
12
 Article 15 provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to torture, or to inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other like treatment.’ 
13
 Article 16 provides that ‘[e]very person has a right to be treated with dignity worthy of a human being and not 
to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
14
 Article 18(2) provides that ‘[a] person shall not be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.’ See also Article 29(2) which prohibits the torture of children. 
15
 Section 19(3) provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subject to torture of any kind or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’  
16
 Article 7(1) provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other such treatment.’ 
17
 Section 8(2)(b) provides that ‘[n]o persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’ 
18
 Article 53 provides that ‘[n]o person may be subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
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is not protected. The correct interpretation is that the right to freedom from torture of 
everyone including non-citizens is protected. The constitutions of Swaziland,
19
 South 
Africa
20
, Malawi,
21
 and Zimbabwe
22
 provide that the right to freedom from torture is 
absolute, that is, non-derogable. The other remaining constitutions do not expressly provide 
that the right to freedom from torture is non-derogable. However, they provide that no one 
“shall” be subjected to torture. This could be interpreted to mean that the right to freedom 
from torture is absolute. The right to freedom from torture is also absolute under international 
law.
23
 Therefore, the fact that the constitution does not expressly provide that the right to 
freedom from torture is absolute should not be interpreted to mean that that right is not 
absolute. Unlike the above constitutions, the Constitution of Swaziland specifically provides 
that children shall not be subjected to torture and that  
“Law enforcement officials may not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior 
orders or exceptional circumstances as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”24 
 
Unlike all the above constitutions, the Constitution of Mozambique expressly provides that 
“[a]ll evidence obtained through the use of torture ... shall be invalid.”25 As will be discussed 
later, although the constitutions of the other countries do not expressly provide that evidence 
obtained through torture is inadmissible, there are other pieces of legislation that provide that 
such evidence is inadmissible. Also unlike all the above constitutions, the Constitution of 
Mozambique expressly bars the extradition of a person to a country where he could be 
subjected to torture. Article 67(3) of the Constitution of Mozambique provides that:  
“Extradition shall not be permitted for crimes which are punishable by death or by perpetual 
imprisonment under the law of the requesting State, or when there are grounds to believe that the 
extradited person may be subjected to torture or inhumane, degrading or cruel treatment.” 
 
However, as will be discussed shortly, jurisprudence emanating from other countries that do 
not have the same constitutional provision also make it clear that it would be unconstitutional 
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20
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22
 Section 86(3)(c). 
23
 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC/2/ 24 January 2008, para 1 (where it is stated that the prohibition of torture is absolute in customary 
international law). 
24
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25
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Domestic courts and the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom from Torture in Southern African 
Development Community Countries 
25 
 
and contrary to international law to extradite a person to a country where he could be 
subjected to torture. Our attention now shifts to the discussion of the jurisprudence emanating 
from SADC courts on the question of the right to freedom from torture. 
 
3. DEFINITION OF TORTURE 
Torture is defined in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture.
26
 At the time of writing 
Mauritius and South Africa were the only countries in SADC that had enacted legislation 
incorporating the CAT definition of torture.
27
 Namibia was in the process of enacting 
legislation to criminalise torture and also to incorporate the CAT definition in domestic 
legislation.
28
 Because of the fact that torture is prohibited by the constitutions of all SADC 
countries, courts have had to deal with cases alleging the violation or abuse of the right to 
freedom from torture. The lack of the definition of torture in domestic law prompted the 
South African Supreme Court of Appeal
29
 and High Court
30
 to rely on the definition of 
torture under the Convention against Torture in giving meaning to the right to freedom from 
torture. This was the case although the CAT was yet to be domesticated in South Africa.
31
 
The High Court of Zimbabwe relied on the definition of torture under CAT to hold that the 
assaults meted out on the applicant amounted to torture.
32
 This was so despite of the fact that 
Zimbabwe has not yet signed or ratified CAT and the then Constitution of Zimbabwe did not 
empower the court to refer to international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.
33
 The 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that the prohibition of torture could be found in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the ICCPR, the Inter-American Convention 
                                                          
26
 Article 1 of the Convention against Torture defines torture to mean ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’ 
27
 See Criminal Code of 29 December 1838 (amended by Bill No.XVI, 2003) (Mauritius) and section 3 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 (South Africa).  
28
 See Namibia’s Third Periodic Report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2010) pg 24 
(where Namibia informs the African Commission that it is in the process of enacting a law on torture and that a 
bill had been drafted) at http://www.achpr.org/english/state_reports/Namibia/3rd%20report.pdf ( last accessed 
19-03-2012).  
29
 S v Mthembu 2008(2) SACR 407(SCA) para 30. 
30
 Kutumela v Minister of Safety and Security [2008] ZAGPHC 430 (12 December 2008) para 86. 
31
 It has to be recalled that section 39 of the South African constitution empowers courts to refer to international 
law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
32
 S v Reza [2003] ZWHHC 219; HH 2-2004 (11 February 2003) at 6. 
33
 The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights ‘a court, tribunal, 
forum or body must take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a 
party.’ See section 46(1)(c). 
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on Human Rights and other international instruments.
34
 The court came to that conclusion 
although the constitution of Zimbabwe makes it very clear that international conventions do 
not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless they have been incorporated by or under an Act 
of Parliament.
35
 However, the High Court of Zimbabwe made it very clear that because of the 
fact that Zimbabwe is not a party to the CAT, it has not assumed the obligations imposed by 
that treaty.
36
 Although, as mentioned earlier the High Court of Zimbabwe relied on the 
definition of torture in the CAT and the Supreme Court also referred to international and 
regional instruments in finding that international law prohibits torture, there is still a degree 
of uncertainty on the issue of whether the CAT definition of torture is applicable in 
Zimbabwean law. This is because of two reasons: one, Zimbabwe is yet to ratify the CAT and 
international law does not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless such law is domesticated 
by an act of parliament and two, the High Court decision could be departed from by another 
High Court judge or it could be overruled by the Supreme Court.  
 
Like the South African courts and the Zimbabwean courts, the High Court of Malawi has 
referred to Article 1 of CAT in its definition of torture.
37
 This should be viewed against the 
background that the constitution of Malawi, like that of South Africa, also empowers courts 
to rely on international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.
38
 The Constitutional Court of 
Seychelles referred to the definition of torture in Article 1 of CAT to define torture.
39
 Like 
the constitutions of South Africa and Malawi, the constitution of Seychelles empowers courts 
to refer to international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.
40
 What is emerging from the 
above discussion is that courts in some SADC countries have relied on the definition of 
torture under CAT in an attempt to protect the right to freedom from torture. This has been 
the case although in most countries the CAT has not been domesticated and in Zimbabwe it 
has not been ratified. The reference to the CAT definition of torture should also be viewed 
against the background that in some countries such as Zimbabwe domestic law did not 
require or empower courts to refer to international law in interpreting the constitution. It is a 
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 Kachingwe v Minister of Home Affairs NO (17/03) [2005] ZWSC 134 (18 July 2005). 
35
 Article 111B(1)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (1980). Section 327(2)(b) of the 2013 Constitution 
provides that “[a]n international treaty which has been concluded or executed by the President or under the 
President’s authority – does not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law 
through an Act of Parliament.” 
36
 Mann v Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Case No. CA 507/07) [2008] ZWHHC 2 (23 January 2008) at 5. 
37
 Masangano v Attorney General (15 of 2007) [2009] MWHC 31 (9 November 2009) at 25. 
38
 Section 11(2)(c) of the Constitution of Malawi. 
39
 Ponoo v Attorney General (05/2010) [2010] SCCC 4 (16 November 2010) para 36. 
40
 Article 48 of the Constitution of Seychelles. 
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positive development that domestic courts have referred to the definition of torture in CAT in 
these different countries in a sense that courts are invoking international law to enrich 
domestic jurisprudence. In countries where CAT has not been domesticated, countries are 
called upon to adopt the definition of torture under CAT in their legislation. This is because 
of at least five reasons: one, the definition of torture is now considered to be part of 
customary international law;
41
 two, the SADC tribunal has relied on this definition;
42
 three, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has relied on this definition;43 and 
four, in some countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa courts have relied on 
this definition and changing the definition will upset the jurisprudence developed by the 
courts. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the Committee against Torture had called upon 
states parties to the CAT to make sure that the definition of torture in their domestic 
legislation is in line with that under CAT.
44
 By clearly defining torture courts are in a position 
to distinguish between the treatment that amounts to torture and treatment that amounts to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT). Our attention now shifts to 
discussion of the cases in which courts have dealt with CIDT. 
 
4. CIDT 
The constitutions of SADC countries and international treaties prohibit torture and cruel, 
inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. Although there are cases where it is difficult to 
distinguish torture from CIDT,
45
 it is critical that the distinction between these different but 
closely related types of treatment is maintained. This is because of the seriousness of torture 
as an international crime.
46
 Courts in SADC have drawn a distinction between torture on the 
one hand and CIDT on the other hand. In one case the plaintiff was arrested for a traffic 
offence and detained in the following conditions: 
                                                          
41
 See generally, Van der Vyver “Torture as a Crime under International Law” 2003 Albany Law Review 427 – 
463. 
42
 See The United Republic of Tanzania v Cimexpan (Mauritius) Ltd, Case No. SADC(T) 01/2009 (Judgement 
of 11 June 2010). 
43
 See for example, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Communication 334/06 (decided at the 9
th
 extra-ordinary session held from 23 February to 3 March 2011) para 
162. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Mujuzi ” The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment: 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt” (2013) The International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 284 – 294. 
44
 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC/2/ 24 January 2008, para 9. 
45
 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, para 3. 
46
 See generally, Van der Vyver 2003 Albany Law Review 427 – 463; Cassese et al, International Criminal Law: 
Cases and Commentary (2011) Chapter 5. 
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“In one corner of the cell is the toilet for use by the inmates. The toilet is separated from the rest of the 
cell by a one and a half metre high wall. There is no door to the toilet. The toilet was used throughout 
the night. The flushing system of the toilet is operated from outside the cell. On this night, it was only 
flushed once despite the frequent use the inmates subjected it to throughout the night. There was no 
room to sleep. The temperatures were high and no drinking water was provided. No police officer 
checked upon the inmates the entire night. The police have regulations that inmates are to be 
periodically checked upon whilst held in the cells at night in case of emergent illness or some other 
eventuality that may require the opening of the cells. There was no water to wash one’s hands after 
using the toilet. There was no toilet paper. The plaintiff and the inmates were released the following 
morning ... in preparation for court. A pot of tea (without milk) was given the inmates together with 
three cups from which all twenty- four inmates were to share the tea.”47  
 
The High Court of Zimbabwe, in awarding him damages for degrading and inhuman 
treatment observed that the “standards that may be acceptable today may constitute inhuman 
and degrading treatment a decade away.”48 The Court added that “treatment of an arrested, 
detained or convicted person that affronts the dignity of that person, that exceeds the limits of 
civilised standards of decency and involve the unnecessary infliction of suffering or pain is 
inhuman and degrading for the purposes of the supreme law of the land.”49 The Supreme 
Court of Namibia held that section 8 of the Constitution which prohibits torture or cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment prohibits seven different conditions: torture; 
cruel treatment; cruel punishment; inhuman treatment; inhuman punishment; degrading 
treatment; and degrading punishment.
50
 In a case where prisoners argued that their 
imprisonment in overcrowded and poorly ventilated prisons amounted to torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the High Court of Malawi held that: 
“Prisoners have the right not to be subjected to torture and cruel treatment. In this case we hold the 
view that packing inmates in an overcrowded cell with poor ventilation with little or no room to sit or 
lie down with dignity but to be arranged like sardines violates basic human dignity and amounts to 
inhuman and degrading treatment and therefore unconstitutional.”51 
The Court of Appeal of Lesotho, after an inspection in loco, in a case in which the facts were 
more or less like in the Malawian case above held that:
52
 
                                                          
47
 Chituku v Minister of Home Affairs (HC 2587/99) [2004] ZWHHC 6; HH 6-2004 (14 January 2004) at 3. 
48
 Chituku v Minister of Home Affairs at 6. 
49
 Chituku v Minister of Home Affairs page 6. 
50
 Ex parte: Attorney-General, In Re: Corporal Punishment by Organs of State; 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSc) at 19. 
See also McNaband v Minister of Home Affairs NO (I2852/05) [2007] NAHC 50 (12 July 2007) para 47; 
Namunjepo v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison 2000 (6) BCLR 671 (NmS).  
51
 Masangano v Attorney General (15 of 2007) [2009] MWHC 31 (9 November 2009) pg 38. 
52
 Mothobi v Director of Prisons  [1996] LSCA 92 (16 September 1996). 
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“It should be emphasised that awaiting trial prisoners are suspects not convicts. The state is obliged to 
keep them in reasonably healthy and comfortable surroundings than they do. In these days when there 
are water-flush toilets, there is no conceivable reason why any human should stay ... along with others 
in a cell measuring 8 paces by 8 paces with a bucket or pail containing his excrement and that of others 
for fourteen hours. Staying with one's excrement might be understandable but staying with that of 
others is simply torture. Conditions for awaiting trial prisoners cannot be allowed to remain as they are 
at present. If the purpose of keeping awaiting trial prisoners in this way was to torture them that could 
be understandable (assuming in this day and age the State considers itself to have a right to torture 
people) a right the State no more has even in respect of convicted prisoners.”53 
 
It is argued that the above facts disclose inhuman or degrading treatment as opposed to 
torture. Although the conditions in which the applicants were detained were clearly far below 
internationally acceptable standards, it is doubtful that their treatment amounted to torture in 
terms of Article 1 of CAT. The Court of Appeal of Lesotho held that the state has an 
obligation to provide healthcare to a prisoner and that “[a] prisoner may not be detained in 
inhumane conditions. If a prisoner becomes ill, and he is not given sufficient or any medical 
treatment, then his detention becomes inhumane and relief will be granted by the Courts.”54 
SADC courts have thus clearly distinguished between torture on the one hand and CIDT on 
the other hand.
55
 Although courts have not defined what amounts to CIDT,
56
 this is not 
unique to SADC courts. These terms are also not defined in the Convention against Torture. 
This is attributable to the drafting history of the Convention where the drafters of the 
Convention found it “impossible to achieve a definition of the cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”57 As a result, the Committee against Torture has taken a case-by-
case analysis of what amounts to CIDT.
58
 The Committee against Torture has expressed the 
view that although the circumstances leading to torture also lead to CIDT, there is a 
difference between torture and CIDT. It is the degree of the severity of the pain or suffering 
                                                          
53
 Mothobi v Director of Prisons  at 14 – 15. 
54
 Mothobi v Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] LSCA 89 (5 August 1992) at 5. 
55
 Although in one case the High Court of Zimbabwe expressed the view that ‘[t]orture is a degrading and 
inhuman treatment.’ See S v Reza (Crim. Appeal 159/03) [2003] ZWHHC 219; HH 2-2004 (11 February 2003) 
pg 7. 
56
 The Constitutional Court of Seychelles mentions the fact that the Attorney-General refers to the dictionary 
meaning of “inhuman” treatment but it does not give a definition of that term. See Simeon v Attorney General 
(1/2010) [2010] SCCC 3 (28 September 2010) para 35. In Woods v Commissioner of Prisons (78/01) [2003] 
ZWSC 74 (17 November 2003) the Supreme Court on Zimbabwe referred to some jurisprudence from the 
European Court of Human Rights on what amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment to hold that the refusal 
by the respondent to transfer the applicant to South Africa for specialised medical treatment did not amount to 
inhuman treatment. 
57
 Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture: An Assessment (2001) 248. 
58
 See generally Nowak and McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (2008) 
540 – 576. 
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that distinguishes torture from the CIDT.
59
 This is the same approach that has been taken by 
the SADC courts. 
 
5. THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE IN THE 
EYES OF THE COURTS 
As indicted earlier, the right to freedom from torture is an absolute right under the 
constitutions of various SADC countries and under international law. We will now have a 
look at the jurisprudence of various SADC courts to establish how courts have approached 
the question of the status of the prohibition of torture. The Court of Appeal of Lesotho held 
that “[t]he right not to be tortured, together with the right to life ... are the two most 
fundamental of all the rights conferred by the Constitution.”60 The High Court of Lesotho 
held that under no circumstances should the right to freedom from torture be violated
61
 and 
that the state does not have the right to torture people.
62
 The High Court of Lesotho took 
judicial notice of the fact that law enforcement officers widely tortured suspects in Lesotho.
63
 
The Supreme Court of Namibia held that the constitution absolutely prohibits torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
64
 The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that 
citizens and non-citizens have the right to freedom from torture.
65
 The High Court of 
Zimbabwe held that the prohibition of torture has attained the status of customary 
international law which is superior over all other laws.
66
 Referring to international law, the 
High Court of Zimbabwe held that: 
“The first corollary of the universal proscription of torture is that it imposes upon every State 
obligations which are applicable erga omnes, that is to say, towards all other States, which are then 
endowed with correlative rights. The second corollary is that the principle against torture has evolved 
into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, viz. a principle endowed with primacy in the hierarchy of rules 
that constitute the international normative order. As such, it cannot be derogated or deviated from by 
any State or group of States.”67 
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 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties), 
CAT/C/GC/2/ 24 January 2008, para 10. 
60
 Commander, Lesotho Defence Force  v Letsie (CIV) 28/09) [2010] LSCA 26 (22 October 2010) at 14. 
61
 Lerotholi v Commander of Lesotho Defence Force (CIV/APN/270/2007) [2007] LSHC 8 (2 July 2007). 
62
 Mothobi v Director of Prisons [1996] LSCA 92 (16 September 1996) at 15. 
63
 Lerotholi v Commander of Lesotho Defence Force at 18. 
64
 Ex parte: Attorney-General, In Re: Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSc) para 3 
(Judgment by Bekker C.J) para 20 (Mohamed AJA). 
65
 Kachingwe v Minister of Home Affairs NO (17/03) [2005] ZWSC 134; SC145/04 (18 July 2005). 
66
 Mann v Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Case No. CA 507/07) [2008] ZWHHC 2 (23 January 2008) at 6. 
67
 Mann v Republic of Equatorial Guinea at 14. 
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That was a profound statement that clearly reflected the status of the prohibition of torture in 
international law. The Court goes beyond stating that the right to freedom from torture is 
absolute to state that it has attained that status of jus cogens. The High Court of Swaziland 
held that the enjoyment of the right to freedom from torture is “absolute and non-
derogable.”68 Although at the time of the judgement torture was yet to be criminalised in 
South Africa, the South African high court observed that torture was “a criminal offence.”69 
The Court of Appeal of Botswana emphasised the importance of the prohibition against 
torture and CIDT in the following terms: 
“The proscribed elements of torture, and inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment are 
pregnant with meaning and are powerful concepts reaching down to the very depths of a person’s 
humanity and to his right not to be treated in a manner which robs him of his human dignity and 
worth.”70 
 
The above examples show that courts in SADC have taken the prohibition against torture 
seriously. Aside from holding that the right to freedom from torture is absolute, some courts, 
like the Zimbabwean High Court, held that the prohibition of torture has attained the status of 
jus cogens in international law. This means, amongst other things, that although Zimbabwe 
was yet to sign or ratify the Convention against Torture at the time of writing,
71
 it has an 
international obligation to prevent torture
72
 and if it cannot prosecute those who have 
committed acts of torture it should extradite them to other countries for prosecution. Related 
to the above, the South African High court referred to torture as a criminal offence although 
South Africa was yet to criminalise torture.
73
 The government should therefore make sure 
that torture is criminalised and its perpetrators are punished.  
6. ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE FOR TORTURE 
In their jurisprudence SADC courts have also highlighted the environment conducive for 
torture. Understanding this environment is critical if torture is to be eliminated. Examples that 
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courts have identified as conductive for torture include: removing a suspect from a prison to a 
military facility for interrogation in Lesotho
74
 and removing a suspect from prison to a police 
station in Zambia for interrogation enabled the police to torture the accused.
75
 There is 
therefore a need to ensure that people are not transferred from prisons to military or police 
facilities without effective measures to ensure that they are not subjected to torture. Such 
people should, for example, be examined before they leave correctional facilities and after 
they have been returned. When they allege that torture was inflicted on them, those 
allegations should be investigated promptly.
76
 Officers who take them and those who bring 
them back should enter their details in official books at correctional facilities. Prison 
authorities should not readmit to prison people who have been subjected to torture when they 
were taken away for interrogation. The existence and use of secret or non-gazetted detention 
facilities
77
 and the military assuming policing responsibility of enforcing law and order
78
 
have also been identified as some of the factors contributing to torture. It is therefore critical 
that people are detained in gazetted areas to which inspecting authorities have access. The 
army should also not assume the role of law enforcement unless the security situation 
requires their intervention. Law enforcement should be left to the police who are trained to 
deal with such situations. 
 
The collusion of medical officers in torture which could take different forms is also a factor 
that contributes to torture. In Lesotho one medical officer at a military hospital refused to 
give a torture victim a medical report when he was treated for his torture injuries because   
“The officer escorting him instructed the doctor who attended to him not to give him a medical report. 
The respondent requested both a report and to be admitted as a patient. The doctor said he had no 
sympathy for prisoners and refused both requests. He did, however, indicate that he wished to see the 
respondent on a daily basis in order to attend to his injuries.”79 
 
It is therefore important that professional medical bodies sensitise their members on the 
prohibition of torture so that such members do not collude with law enforcement officers in 
the torture of suspects. In cases where medical personnel have directly or indirectly been 
involved in acts of torture, they should be investigated and disciplinary action, depending on 
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the degree of their involvement, be taken against them. Another factor that could contribute 
to torture is for the courts to allow a person who has been subjected to torture or who alleges 
to have been subjected to torture to be detained or imprisoned by those who allegedly 
tortured him/her. The Zimbabwean High Court held that: 
“It may thus be argued that if it is proved that...torture...carried out or authorized by or connived in by 
the state or its officials has preceded the handing over to the police and the courts of an accused person, 
then, as in the case of foreign abductions the judiciary should not condone such delinquent acts.”80 
 
The High Court of Zimbabwe in holding that the police’s detention of suspects for 14 days 
incommunicado was unlawful and violated Zimbabwe’s constitution and its obligations under 
the ICCPR observed that: 
“The respondents have permitted the applicants to be detained incommunicado. People are at risk of 
torture or other forms of ill-treatment if they are detained incommunicado. The risk increases the longer 
they are held as this allows for a longer period for injuries to be inflicted and visible marks of these 
injuries to fade.”81 
 
The same view was expressed by the High Court of Lesotho in the following terms: 
“It is not unknown for torture to be used in order to obtain leads in investigations and even confessions 
that will not be used at the trial. It is for such reasons that lengthy detentions without access are 
avoided because this puts temptations on investigators to use torture and other suspect means. It is 
precisely to remove from investigators the temptation of extracting information oppressively or by 
torture and other suspect means that in our law a detained suspect cannot be detained beyond 48 hours 
without being given a charge.”82 
 
The High Court of Namibia also held that one of the reasons why a suspect should be 
produced before court within 48 hours of his arrest is to assure a judicial officer that such a 
person has not been subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
83
 The fact that courts are aware of the environment conducive for torture means 
that they are able to closely scrutinise any evidence that was obtained when the suspect was 
under such environment. Even in cases where an offender does not allege that he was 
subjected to torture, if the court is convinced that the environment in which he was detained 
was conducive for torture, courts should treat the evidence obtained in such circumstances 
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with caution.
84
 Treating such evidence with caution could discourage law enforcement 
officers from resorting to such means to extract confessions or other pieces of evidence from 
suspects. 
   
7. DEPORTATION OR EXTRADITION 
Human rights jurisprudence, especially from the European Court of Human Rights, is replete 
with examples of individuals who have challenged their deportation or extradition to other 
countries on the grounds that there is a risk that they will be subjected to torture cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
85
 The Convention against Torture expressly 
prohibits the expulsion, return or extradition of a person to a country “where there substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger or being subjected to torture.”86 Our 
attention now shifts to the jurisprudence of courts in some SADC countries on the question of 
deporting or extraditing a person to a country where there is a risk that he/she could be 
subjected to torture. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal held, in a case where the 
Department of Home Affairs attempted to deport two Somali nationals to Somalia, that it 
would be unlawful to deport refugees or asylum seekers to a country which was “a failed or 
dysfunctional state that is unable to maintain public order or protect the lives of its citizens” 
and where “their lives would be in danger if they were to be forced to return to that 
country.”87 The Court added that: 
“The appellants would face a real risk of suffering physical harm if they were forced to return to 
Somalia. It is obvious that no effective guarantee can be given that the appellants would not be 
persecuted or subjected to some form of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment if they are 
compelled to re-enter that country. It is the prevention of this harm that the [Refugee] Act
88
 seeks to 
address by prohibiting a refugee’s deportation. Deportation to another state that would result in the 
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imposition of a cruel, unusual or degrading punishment is in conflict with the fundamental values of the 
Constitution.”89 
 
It appears that the court could have allowed the deportation of the appellant to Somalia had 
there been “effective guarantees” that they would not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, 
degrading treatment or punishment. The court looked at the general political situation in 
Somalia to conclude that the deportation of the appellants to Somalia would be contrary to 
the values in the South African constitution. In preventing the Department of Home Affairs 
from deporting the applicant to Libya, the South African High Court studied human rights 
reports which showed that political opponents were regularly tortured in Libya, and referred 
to Article 3 of CAT to conclude that if deported to Libya “there was a real risk, more than a 
reasonable possibility, that he will be subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment.”90 The court 
added that the applicant’s political activities made “him vulnerable to the risk of being placed 
in the danger of torture were he to be returned to Libya.”91 The court concluded that even if 
the applicant posed a threat to the South African society, courts are “constrained by the wider 
interests of [the] treaty [CAT] and constitutional obligations to avoid refoulement in the face 
of the risk of torture.”92 This decision raises at least two important issues – one, for the court 
to halt the deportation of the offender on the ground that he would be subjected to torture, 
there has to be “a real risk” which is “more than a reasonable possibility” that the appellant 
would be subjected to torture. The “real risk” test is higher than the “reasonable possibility” 
one. It is argued that even in cases where there is a “reasonable possibility” that the appellant 
would be subjected to torture if deported, courts should not sanction his or deportation. In 
other words, the test should be whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
appellant would be subjected to torture if deported. The second important issue raised by the 
court is that although the Convention against Torture was yet to be domesticated in South 
Africa, the court invoked it to justify its holding that the appellants should not be deported. 
This should be understood in the context that the South African constitution empowers courts 
to refer to international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.
93
 The Constitutional Court of 
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South Africa held that the deportation or surrender of a person to a country where he could be 
sentenced to death, at a time when the death penalty had been declared unconstitutional in 
South Africa on amongst other grounds that that it violated the rights to freedom from torture 
and CIDT, amounted to a violation of that person’s right to freedom from torture and CIDT.94  
The High Court of Zimbabwe held that although Zimbabwe was not party to the CAT which 
in Article 3 prohibits the extradition, return or expulsion of a person to a country where there 
are substantial grounds to believe that he/she could be subjected to torture, international 
customary law requires that “Zimbabwe has an obligation not to extradite any person to a 
country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person so expelled, returned 
or extradited would be in danger of being subjected to torture...”95 The Court added that that: 
“[T]he general prohibition against torture contained in Article 7 of the International Covenant [on Civil 
and Political Rights] and in Article 5 of the African Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights] must be 
construed to incorporate, by necessary intendment, the principle of non-refoulement embodied in 
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. It follows that in order to comply with its general 
obligations against torture under the International Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] and the 
African Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights], Zimbabwe is required to abide by and take into 
account the specific prohibition against extradition to a State where there exists the danger of the 
person extradited being subjected to torture. This is so notwithstanding that Zimbabwe is not a party to 
the Convention against Torture. To construe the general prohibition against torture otherwise would 
inevitably operate to render the prohibition nugatory and illusory on the international plane.”96 
 
However, the court although found that reports by Amnesty International and the 
International Bar Association showed that torture was prevalent in Equatorial Guinea, they 
were not admissible in evidence because they had not been tendered by experts. In other 
words, Amnesty International and the International Bar Association were not expert 
witnesses in the matter.
97
  One has to recall that the European Court of Human Rights, on 
whose jurisprudence the high court partly relied on the issue of extraditing a person to a 
country where he could be subjected to torture, has in some cases relied on the reports by 
Amnesty International and other reputable non-government organisations to hold that the 
deportation of a person to a country in question would be a violation of Article 3 of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which prohibits 
torture.
98
 After finding that the prohibition against torture was part of customary law, it 
remains unclear why the court still invoked a legal technicality to exclude such vital pieces of 
evidence. Had the court not excluded that evidence, it would probably not have allowed the 
extradition of the appellant to Equatorial Guinea. Nothing barred the court from at least 
admitting those reports as hearsay evidence
99
 or documentary evidence.
100
  
 
8. PROVING ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE 
Another important issue is the type of evidence that courts have accepted in proving 
allegations of torture. Although, as will be discussed shortly, medical evidence has been 
tendered by applicants in many courts to prove allegations of torture, there have been cases 
where although courts have not specifically asked the applicants to adduce medical reports to 
substantiate the allegations that they were subjected to torture, such reports have been 
tendered into evidence by the applicants. This has been the case in some cases in 
Zimbabwe,
101
 Malawi,
102
 and Lesotho.
103
 The High Court of Lesotho found the “applicant’s 
story of torture and maltreatment unconvincing” because the applicant did not tender medical 
evidence to substantiate his claim that he had been tortured.
104
 In declining to award the 
plaintiff damages for torture, the High Court of Malawi held that: 
“The plaintiff was kept in the cells for 5 days before being taken to court where bail was granted upon 
application. The plaintiff alleged that he was tortured by police and that this including beatings during 
the five days. I want to believe that if indeed there was torture of the level attested to by the plaintiff he 
would have gone to hospital upon release on bail and medical proof of the same would have been 
tendered in court. In the absence of the same I have difficulties assessing the level of the same.”105 
 
In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for damages for torture, the Namibian high court held that 
her claim that she had been tortured was not “plausible” because “there was no mark or signs 
either physically or mentally on her” and that if she had indeed been tortured she would have 
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sought medical attention.
106
 In dismissing the accused’s allegation contained in his affidavit 
that he had been tortured, the High Court of Lesotho held that there was “no proof of any 
torture having taken place”, that there was “no mark or any sign whatsoever to indicate that 
he had been” tortured and that there was “no ground on which th[e] court can without proof 
accept that bare allegation especially when observations are made in court of the accused 
person who appears perfectly normal without any physical signs of torture.”107 Although this 
case is unique in a sense that the accused chose not to testify in his own defence, a right 
which is guaranteed to him by the Constitution,
108
 the above ruling has two challenges. First, 
the court appears to base its finding on the wrong assumption that all torture victims should 
have marks on their bodies indicating that they were tortured. This assumption ignores the 
facts that not all torture methods leave marks on victim bodies and that some methods of 
torture are not physical but rather mental. The High Court of Lesotho seems to have ignored 
an earlier decision by the Court of Appeal to the effect that: 
“There are many methods of ... torturing persons who are being interrogated which will leave no visible 
indications to serve later as evidence. Devices such as standing a man naked in front of his 
interrogators for 2 hours at a stretch, putting a bag over his head, or making him crouch while holding a 
stick behind his knees - all which were mentioned in this case - are examples of such methods. The 
practical effect of this is that plaintiffs who have been treated in this fashion will often have great 
difficulty in proving it...”109 
 
The same view was expressed by the High Court of Zimbabwe when it held that torture 
methods that do not leave “permanent or recognisable marks” should also be regarded as 
torture.
110
 The second problem is that the court seems to ignore Article 12 of CAT which 
stipulates that all allegations of torture should be investigated promptly. The High Court of 
Zimbabwe accepted the victim’s allegation that they had been tortured but observed that 
failure to tender a medical report in evidence was a “handicap in the assessment of the 
seriousness of the assault.”111  
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The above jurisprudence on the question of medical evidence points to the fact that medical 
evidence is very important and in some countries essential in proving allegations of torture. 
Courts should be aware that in some cases someone might be a torture victim even if there 
are no physical signs that he was tortured. Where necessary courts should explore the 
possibility of admitting into evidence psychologists’ or psychiatrists’ reports which could 
prove that the applicant was subjected to mental torture. Courts should also remember that 
not all medical doctors are skilled in properly diagnosing torture as some torture marks are 
invisible. Courts should also be aware that not all torture victims are able to afford the costs 
involved in consulting with a medical practitioner for examination and the issuing of a 
medical report. In cases where there is no medical evidence, the court may allow the 
applicant to be cross-examined to test the truthfulness of his or her allegation.  Corroboration 
from another torture victim that the applicant was tortured has also been admitted in evidence 
as proof that the applicant was tortured.
112
 Photographic evidence of the injuries sustained by 
the victim as a result of torture has also been admitted as evidence that the accused was 
tortured.
113
  
 
9. ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS IMPLICATED IN TORTURE 
Although torture is yet to be criminalised in most SADC countries, there are at least three 
actions that have been taken against government officials implicated in torture in some of 
these countries. The Zambian Supreme Court recommended that officers who have been 
found to have tortured suspects should pay damages to their victims.
114
 Such a 
recommendation would have no impact unless there was a law in place that allows the 
relevant authorities to take such an action. In Banyane v Commissioner of Correctional 
Services and Another
115
 the High Court of Lesotho held that it was lawful for the applicant, 
who was found at the disciplinary hearing of the Lesotho Correctional Services to have 
tortured inmates, to be demoted from the rank of Senior Principle Officer to the lowest rank 
of Correctional Officer. However, the Court held that it was unlawful to reduce the 
applicant’s salary in addition to his demotion because the relevant law only permitted the 
demotion of the applicant and not the reduction of his salary. Such a law needs to be amended 
to ensure that someone who has been demoted for torture and other human rights violations 
does not only lose his title but also has his/her income affected. The South African Supreme 
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Court of Appeal has called for the prosecution police officers implicated in torture.
116
 Unlike 
in the case of torture where courts have held that the perpetrators should personally be held 
accountable for the torture, courts have taken a different view when it comes to CIDT. The 
High Court of Namibia held in a case where suspects were detained in police cells in 
inhumane conditions that “the police officers cannot be held liable for the degrading and 
inhuman conditions prevailing in the holding cells.”117 The High Court of South Africa held 
that senior police officers could not “have been so stupid” to inflict visible torture injuries on 
the complainant as this would have meant “risking their professions by committing such a 
criminal offence.”118 This may be interpreted to mean that if proved to have been involved in 
torture, law enforcement officers are likely to lose their jobs. This has indeed been the case 
where some police officers have been investigated for allegedly committing acts of torture.
119
 
In sentencing the accused to 12 months’ imprisonment, the High Court of Zimbabwe held 
that a sentence of fine or community service was inappropriate in case where it was proved 
that the accused had tortured suspects.
120
 In this case although the court found that the 
accused had tortured the suspects, they were convicted of assault causing grievous bodily 
harm because torture is not criminalised in Zimbabwe.  After finding that the appellants, 
police officers, had tortured the suspect, the High Court of Zimbabwe held that “[t]hose who 
engage in the torture of suspects should ordinarily receive a substantial custodial 
sentence.”121 However, the court sentenced them to a fine or three months’ imprisonment in 
the event of failing to pay the fine.
122
 What is emerging from the above jurisprudence is that 
courts are willing to do whatever is permissible by the law to make sure that the perpetrators 
of torture are held accountable. But courts have very limited room to manoeuvre because of 
the fact that torture is not criminalised in the respective jurisdictions and courts cannot make 
orders that cannot be justified in terms of the pieces of legislation they are interpreting.   
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10. SOME FORMS OF PUNISHMENT AS TORTURE 
Courts in different SADC countries have been called upon to determine whether certain 
forms of punishments amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. In South 
Africa courts have referred to treaties such as the Convention against Torture to find that 
sentences such capital punishment
123
 and corporal punishment
124
 are unconstitutional for 
violating the rights to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In Namibia it was held that a punishment, like a minimum sentence, which is 
disproportionate to the offence amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment.
125
 The Court of 
Appeal of Botswana in reducing the appellant’s sentence of 34½ years’ imprisonment to 20 
years’ imprisonment held that: 
“It is now well recognised that where the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences is so excessive as 
to be grossly disproportionate to the offence charged, this amounts to inhuman or degrading 
punishment. As such it violates section 7(1) of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.”126 
 
The Court of Appeal of Botswana
127
 and the Court of Appeal of Tanzania
128
 held that capital 
punishment did not amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
This is because, amongst other things, that the death penalty is not prohibited in international 
law and is sanctioned by the constitutions of the respective countries. The Constitutional 
Court of Seychelles held that a five year minimum sentence for theft for a first offender was 
not disproportional and therefore did not amount to torture or cruel punishment
129
 and also 
that a 10 year minimum sentence for drug-related offences did not amount to torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
130
 The Court of Appeal of Botswana held 
that  the Penal Code Act provision which provided that a minimum sentence for rape had to 
run consecutively with other sentences hence leading to offenders with multiple convictions 
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being sentenced to lengthy prison terms violated section 7(1) of the Constitution which 
prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
131
 Some courts have 
thus made it clear that irrespective of the heinous nature of the offence of which the offender 
has been convicted, the punishment to be imposed on that person should not violate his right 
to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
11. EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH TORTURE 
The constitutions of different SADC countries provide that an accused shall not be compelled 
to incriminate himself or herself or to give evidence at his or her trial.
132
 The CAT expressly 
provides that any statement obtained through torture should be inadmissible.
133
 As will be 
shown shortly, courts in different SADC countries have referred to legislation which requires 
the exclusion of evidence obtained coercion or torture to declare such evidence inadmissible. 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa held that if  
“[D]erivative evidence is obtained as a result of torture there might be compelling reasons of public 
policy for holding such evidence to be inadmissible even if it can be proved independently of the 
accused. Otherwise, the ends might be allowed to justify the means. The admission of evidence in such 
circumstances could easily bring the administration of justice into disrepute and undermine the sanctity 
of the constitutional right which has been trampled upon.”134 
 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has also held that evidence obtained through 
torture, whether the torture was inflicted on the co-accused or the accused himself is 
inadmissible.
135
 Courts in Lesotho
136
, Swaziland,
137
 Zimbabwe,
138
 and South Africa
139
 have 
held that evidence of a pointing-out made as a result of torture is inadmissible. The High 
Court of Malawi held that a confession obtained through physical or mental torture is 
inadmissible in evidence
140
 and that statements obtained through torture are “entirely 
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inadmissible in evidence.”141 The Namibian High Court held that a confession, statement or 
admission obtained through torture is inadmissible.
142
 The High Court of Zimbabwe held that 
a confession obtained through torture is inadmissible.
143
 The Court of Appeal of Swaziland 
held that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible.
144
 Likewise, the Court of Appeal 
of Tanzania held that however relevant to the case a confession is it is not admissible in 
evidence if “obtained through torture or threats.”145 This holding is important in at least two 
respects, one, Tanzania is not a state party to the CAT which specifically provides that states 
parties shall enact laws that will make evidence obtained through torture inadmissible. 
Second, for the statement to be excluded, the threats do not have to be of torture. This 
underlines the fact that confessions have to be made voluntarily.  
 
In holding that evidence obtained through torture should be excluded, the High Court of 
Malawi held that “[a] rule allowing use of evidence obtained by torture is unconstitutional, 
unreasonable, does not comply with international human rights standards and is not necessary 
in an open democratic society” and that “allowing such evidence, may licence public officials 
to use torture in pursuit of public goals and interests with so much compromise on citizens’ 
rights.”146 The High Court of Zambia held that a confession obtained through physical or 
mental torture is inadmissible “even though a court may be satisfied that what an accused 
person said in a statement to the Police is in fact true.”147 The law in countries such as South 
Africa
148
 and Zambia
149
 make it very clear that if the accused alleges that the a confession or 
statement was extracted through torture, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statement or confession was made voluntarily. This is one of the 
safeguards to ensure that the accused are not compelled to testify against himself. 
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12. CONCLUSION  
The right to freedom from torture is protected not only in the constitutions of all SADC 
countries but also in some of the regional and international human rights instruments that 
have been signed, ratified or acceded to by these countries. This article has discussed the 
measures taken by courts in different SADC countries to protect the right to freedom from 
torture. The author has focused on the following issues and made recommendations where 
appropriate: the definition of torture, the difference between torture on the one hand and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment on the other hand, the status of the right to freedom 
from torture in the eyes of the courts, the factors that courts consider as creating a conducive 
environment for torture, the issue of deporting or extraditing a person to a country where he 
or she could be subjected to torture, proving allegations of torture, some forms of punishment 
that have been declared as torture, and the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture.  
  
 
